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RIGHT1, RIGHT2, RIGHT3, RIGHT4, 
AND HOW ABOUT RIGHT? 
LAYMAN E. ALLEN 
INTRODUCTION 
Careful communication is frequently of central importance in law. 
The language used to communicate even with oneself in private 
thought profoundly influences the quality of that effort; but when 
one attempts to transmit an idea to another, language assumes even 
greater significance because of the possibilities for enormously dis­
torting the idea. Word-skill is to be prized. Few have expressed this 
more aptly or succinctly than Wesley N. Hohfeld:l 
... [I] n any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non­
legal, chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought 
and to lucid expression. 
Such a proposition should not be controversial among lawyers and 
legal scholars. In any event, the starting assumption of this article is 
that careful communication is sometimes useful. To facilitate such 
communication where it is deemed desirable, the discussion that fol­
lows is aimed at helping to clarify one of the fundamental concepts 
in legal discourse - namely, the concept of right. This task will be 
approached in the spirit in which Felix S. Cohen explored such 
ideas2 - uot asking, 
What does the term 'right' really mean? 
but rather, 
How is it most useful to define it? 
Certainly, it is still worth while to do what we can to make less 
haunting the chilling, more-than-half-century-old reminder of John 
Chipman Gray:a 
... The student of Jurisprudence is at times troubled by the 
thought that he is dealing not with things, but with words, that 
he is busy with the shape and size of counters in a game of 
logomachy, but when he fully realizes how these words have 
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been passed and are still being passed as m oney, not only by 
fools and on fools, but by and on some of the acutest m inds, he 
feels that there is work worthy of being done, if only it can be 
done worthily. 
DISTINGUISHING VARIOUS SENSES OF 'RIGHT' 
In his classic effort to help clarify legal discourse by specifying for 
it a set of "lowest common denominators," Hohfeld indicates prior 
judicial recognition that the term 'right' is used indiscriminately and 
ambiguously to denote a wide variety of legal relations. 4 Sometimes 
'right' is used to indicate a privilege to do something. On other occa­
sions its reference is to a power to create some legal relationship. Still 
other times it is used to show that someone has immunity from hav­
ing his legal status changed in some way. M ostly, however, it is used 
to refer to right in the strict sense of somebody else's obligation to do 
something for the right-holder.5 For each of these four different 
senses of 'right', Hohfeld stipulated a different term: 




Right1 • The definite and appropriate meanin g  that Hohfeld stipu­
lated 'right' (in the strict sense of a legally enforceable claim) should 
refer to is the correlative of 'duty'. He gave as example:G 
... [I] f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the for­
mer's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a 
duty toward X to stay off the place. 
Hohfeld, in effect, thus specified 'right' to refer to a three-term rela­
tionship between two persons and an action-the right-holder, the 
other party, and an act of the other party. To say that x has a (legal) 
right that p shall be done by y is the same as to say that it is obliga­
tory that p be done by y for x, and that the legal system will enforce 
the obligation. 
Consider a statement like 'The ball is red'. This statement attri­
butes the property red (R) to the ball (b). An abbreviated way of 
writing it is 'Rb'. Just as 'Rb' is an abbreviated way of writing 'The 
ball is red', so too is '(Rpy)x', or more briefly, 'Rpyx' an abbreviated 
way of writing 'x has a right that p be done by y'. 
Right2• Hohfeld emphasized the importance of distinguishing the 
concept of privilege from the concept of right, and he reserved the 
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term 'privilege' to refer to what one person was permitted to do as 
far as some other person was concerned. Continuing the prior exam­
ple, he states:' 
. . . [W] hereas X has a right or claim that Y, the other man, 
should stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering 
on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to 
stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to 
stay off. 
So, 'privilege' also is also, in effect, specified by Hohfeld to refer to a 
three-term relationship between two persons and an action - the 
privilege-holder, the other party, and an act of the privilege-holder. 
To say that x has a (legal) privilege to do p as far as y is concerned is 
the same as to say that it i s  permissible for p to be done as far as y is 
concerned by x and that the legal system will not enforce any at­
tempt through litigation by y to prevent x from doing p. 
Right3• For Hohfeld 'power' is most usefully reserved to refer to 
the change in legal relations that results from some "superadded fact 
or group of facts which are under the volitional control of one or 
more human beings." The person (or persons) whose volitional con­
trol is paramount has the (legal) power to effect the particular 
change of legal relations. He gave the following example of terminat­
ings a legal relation:9 
.... X, the owner of ordinary personal property "in a tangible 
object" has the power to extinguish his own legal interest 
(rights, powers, immunities, etc.) through that totality of oper­
ative facts known as abandonment; and - simultaneously and 
correlatively - to create in other persons privileges and powers 
relating to the abandoned object, - e.g., the power to acquire 
title to the latter by appropriating it. Similarly, X has the power 
to transfer his interest to Y, - that is, to extinguish his own 
interest and concomitantly create in Y a new and corresponding 
interest. 
Hence, Hohfeld's treatment of 'power' is significantly different from 
the treatment of 'right' and 'privilege'. The latter pair of terms refer 
to three-term relationships, while 'power' is, in effect, stipulated to 
refer to a two-term relationship between (a) the changing of a legal 
relation and (b) the power-holder. To say that x has the (legal) power 
to create legal relation r is the same as to say that legal relation r is 
not so now, that it is within the volitional control of x to do p, and 
that if x does p then legal relation r will be created. 
Right4• Hohfeld saw parallels between the right-privilege relation­
ship and t.Pe power-immunity relationship. In his words: 
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... A right is one's affirmative claim against another, and a pri­
vilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of another. Sim­
ilarly, a power is one's affirmative "control" over a given legal 
relation as against another; whereas an immunity is one's free­
dom from the legal power of "control" of another as regards 
some legal relation .. . .  X, a landowner, has, as we have seen, 
power to alienate to Y or to any other ordinary party. On the 
other hand, X has also various immunities as against Y, and all 
other ordinary parties. For Y is under a disability (i.e., has no 
power) so far as shifting the legal interest either to himself or to 
a third party is concerned; and what is true of Y applies similar­
ly to every one else who h� not by virtue of special operative 
facts acquired a power to alienate X's property. 
Like the treatment of 'power', the term 'immunity' is, in effect, 
treated as referring to a two-term relationship between (a) the chang­
ing of a legal relation and (b) the disability-holder (the person who 
does not have power to change that legal relation). To Hohfeld, to 
say that x has an immunity from y's control with respect to creating 
legal relation r would be to say (a) that legal relation r is not so now 
and (b) that although it may be within the volitional control of y to 
do p, it is not so that by virtue of y's doing p that legal relation r will 
be created. If the concepts of power and immunity were going to be 
treated in detail here (they are not), it would be useful to amend this 
slightly by saying that to say that legal relation r has an immt1nity 
from y's control would be to say that (a) legal relation r is not so 
now and (b) that although it may be within the volitional control of 
y to do p, it is not so that by virtue of y's doing p that legal relation r 
will be created. 
The remarks above about Rights0 ,2 ,3 ,& 4 > are slight elaborations 
on what Hohfeld actually said about 'right', 'privilege', 'power', and 
'immunity', but they are only clarifications that facilitate transition 
to the discussion of a formally defined concept of right to be pur­
sued here and are not in any way inconsistent to Hohfeld's ideas. It is 
the idea of right (in the strict sense), indicated by Hohfeld by the 
term 'right' and indicated here by the term 'Right1' , that attention 
shall be focused on. Some considerations involved in formally defin­
ing the concept of right will be explored, and a preliminary proposal 
for defining it will be undertaken. The relationship of the proposed 
defined concept of right to proposed defined concepts of privilege, 
duty, and noright will be considered, and some of the relationships 
of right to proposals that will be made in the future for defining 
power, immunity, liability, and disability will be briefly sketched. 
Hohfeld's monumental contribution in clarifying the language 
available for discussing law was the precursor of legal realism.aa The 
magnitude of his influence is revealed in the efforts of his disciples -
Walter Wheeler Cook, Arthur L. Corbin, and Karl Llewellyn - who 
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were among the leading lights of realism in law. Further refinement 
along the lines that Hohfeld charted may well pave the way for an­
other major breakthrough in legal thought and practice by signifi­
cantly enhancing the compatibility of law and computers and the 
usefulness of the latter to the former in the emerging electronic age. 
It is to this purpose that these preliminary efforts toward formalizing 
the Hohfeldian system of legal analysis are addressed . 
Before turning to the formal definition of right, there is a preli­
minary matter to be considered. It would be useful to have a clear 
and unambiguous way of indicating the occurrence of a defined 
term. A commonly-used method in legal writing is to capitalize the 
first letter of the defined term. Hence, by stipulation a Defined term 
(like this one, i .e ., the word 'Defined') is a word whose initial letter is 
capitalized. This works fine most - but not all - of the time. Defin­
ed terms may appear as the first words of a sentence. Then it is not 
clear whether the word is 
a) being used in its Defined sense and therefore being capital­
ized for being both the initial word of a sentence and occur­
rence of a word used in a Defined sense, or 
b) being used in a sense other than its Defined sense and there­
fore being capitalized only because it is the first word of a 
sentence. 
An alternative method for indicating a DefineD term is to capitalize 
both the first and last letters of the term. DefineD terms used in 
their DefineD sense would then be distinguished from those same 
terms used in a sense other than their DefineD sense. This is the 
method that will be used for indicating occurrences of DefineD terms 
in this article. Thus, 'RighT' will indicate an occurrence of a De­
fineD term. 
Formal Definition of 'RighT'9b 
In approaching the task of formally defining the term 'Right', re­
call that to say (in a Hohfeldian sense) that x has a (legal) right that p 
shall be done by y is the same as to say that it is obligatory that p be 
done by y for x and that the legal system will enforce the obligation. 
The statement 'x has a right that p shall be done by y' can be abbre­
viated by the expression 'Right-pyx'. Hereafter, such abbreviations 
will be indicated by statements such as the following: 
(1) RighT-pyx =ab x has a right that p shall be done by y. 
The '=ab' indicates that the statement on its right is equal (by 
abbreviation) to the statement on its left. 
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Note that to say that it is  obligatory that p be done by y for x and 
that the legal system will enforce the obligation is the same as to say 
that it is (legally) obligatory that p be done by y for x. The various 
parts of the statement 'it is (legally) obligatory that p be done by y 
for x' can be abbreviated as follows: 
(2) 0 =ab it is (legally) obligatory that 
(3) D2py =ab p is done by y 
(4) D4px =ab p is done for x 
(5) D24pyx =ab p is done by y for x. 
Using these abbreviations the formal contextual definition of 'RighT' 
is as follows: 
(6) RighT-pyx =df OD24pyx. 
It may be helpful in reading an expression like 'RighT-pyx' to con­
sider its similarity to another statement that cont.a.ins a three-term 
relation. Consider the three-term relation indicated by the term 'Be­
tweeN' in a statement like 'Philadelphia is between Boston and Wash­
ington'. The statement can be abbreviated as follows: 
(7) BetweeN-bwp =ab Philadelphia is between Boston and 
Washington. 
This abbreviation indicates that 'BetweeN' is a three-term relation 
that relates the terms 'b', 'w', and 'p' just as 'RighT' is a three-term 
relation that relates the terms 'p', 'y', and 'x'. Another way of look­
ing at 'BetweeN-bwp' is to regard 'BetweeN-bw' as a property (or 
predicate or one-term relation) of p so that 'BetweeN-bwp' is re­
garded as saying that Philadelphia (p) has the property (BetweeN-bw) 
of being between Baltimore and Washington. Similarly, instead of re­
garding 'RighT' as a three-term relation in 'RighT-pyx', we could just 
as well look at 'RighT-py' as a property of x so that 'RighT-pyx' 
would be interpreted as saying that x has the property (RighT-py) of 
having a right that p be done by y. Hence, just as: 
(8) Rb =ab The ball has the property of being round 
(which is another way of saying that the ball 
is round). 
is used in standard logical notation to indicate the property (round� 
ness) is predicated of the object (the ball), so also: 
(9) RighT-pyx =ab x has the property of having a RighT-py. 
This may be helpful in appreciating the rationale underlying the 
(seemingly) peculiar order of the symbols in 'RighT-pyx' in which 
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the right-holder, x, appears last even though in the statement 'x has a 
right that p be done by y• x appears first. 
Since 'RighT' in (6) is defined in terms of')' and 'D24', we shall 
have a formal definition of 'RighT' only when 'O' and 'D24' have 
been formally defined. First we whall consider the formal definition 
of 'O', which is used to indicate the concept of legal obligation. We 
shall, in the manner of Alan R. Anderson,10 treat •o• as a unary 
operator operating on a proposition (the idea expressed by a sen­
tence), rather than as operating on a class (of acts) in the manner of 
Georg von Wright.11 
There are certain properties that any adequate definition of legal 
obligation should have. The six properties that will be considered 
here are not in any sense thought to be a comprehensive list. They 
happen to be six that distinguish among various formal systems that 
have been formuJated by logicians as pomble candidates to be used 
for defining the concept of obligation. The concept of legal obligation 
that is defined in a formal syst.em should (I believe, at this time) be 
such that it has the following six properties: 
(Pl) It is not provable in the formal system that from 'it is 
(legally) obligatory that p", it is valid to infer "it is (legal­
ly) obligatory that it is (legally) obligatory that p•. 
Using '--o' to indicate non-provability, (Pl) can be abbreviated as 
follows: 
Op-o OOp. 
(P2) Op --0 Lop. 
(It is not provable in the formal system that from 'it is 
(legally) obligatory that p', it is valid to infer 'it is logi­
rally necessary (L) that it is (legally) obligat.ory that p".) 
(P3) --o 0 (if p, then p ). 
(It is not provable in the formal syst.em that logical 
tautologies (such as, 'if p, then p') are (legally) obliga­
tory.) 
(P4) p -o OPp. 
(It is not provable in the formal sysrem that from 'p", it 
is valid to infer 'it is (legally) obligatory that it is (legal­
ly) permitted that p• (where 'P' indicates legal pennis­
sion and 'Pp" is defined as 'not obligatory not p').) 
(P5) It is provable in the formal system that 'it is (legally) 
obligatory that if it is (legally) obligatory that p, then p 
is true'. (In other words, legal obligations (legally) ought 
to be fulfilled.) 
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Using '-**' to indicate provability, (P5) can be abbreviated as 
follows: 
-** 0 (if Op, then p ). 
(P6) Op, 0 (if p, then q) -** Oq. 
It is provable in the formal system that from 'it is obli­
gatory that p' and 'it is (legally) obligatory that if p, then 
q', it is valid to infer 'it is (legally) obligatory that q'. 
For the first four properties, it is evident and easy to illustrate that 
any reasonable formal definition of the concept of legal obligation 
should result in the non-provability statements (Pl)-(P4). If instead 
of (Pl), Op -** OOp, then from a statement such as: 
(10) It is obligatory in Michigan now that persons with earn­
ings of $10,000 file a state income tax statement. 
it would be possible to prove as a matter of logic: 
(11) it is obligatory that (10). 
Certainly, just because (10) happens to be true, we would not want 
the concept of legal obligation so defined that as a matter of logic it 
is provable that (11) is true-in effect, that it is (legally) obligatory 
that Michigan have a state income tax. Although it is certainly true 
that it is (legally) permitted that Michigan have a state income tax, it 
is just as true that it is also (legally) permitted that Michigan not have 
a state income tax. In fact, in 1960 it did not have such a tax, while 
in 1968 it did-and both were (legally) permitted. Furthermore, if the 
Michigan legislature wishes to terminate this tax, it certainly has the 
legal power to do so. Hence, just because (10) happens to be true, we 
would not want to deime the concept of legal obligation in such a . 
way that it is, therefore, legally obligatory for (10) to be true. 
The argument in favor of (P2) ,  rather than OP-** LOP, is similar. 
Just because (10) happens to be true, we would not want to so define 
the concept of legal obligation that it can be logically proved that 
(12) It is logically necessary that (10). 
If it were necessary as a matter of logic that (10) be true, then it 
would be, in effect, logically impossible for Michigan not to have a 
state income tax. That is clearly absurd. As a matter of fact, until 
very recently Michigan has not had such a tax. 
To argue the concept of legal obligation should be so defined that 
-** 0 (if p, then p), rather than (P3), is the same as asserting that 
for (if p, then p) not to be so is a violation of the law. There is not a 
single statute, constitutional provision, regulation, or other (legal) 
normative command that (to my knowledge) so provides. If tautolo­
gies were universally obligatory (legally) as a matter of logic, then 
there certainly should be more indications of it in (legal) normative 
commands. As a matter of fact, it would seem to be the extreme of 
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redundancy for legislatures to spend their time commanding that 
logical truths be so. If a proposition about the state of affairs is, in 
fact, logically true, then it would be impossible for it to be other­
wise. Such an obligation would be one that would be impossible to 
violate. And what kind of obligation would that be! Certainly it 
would not be one that would likely have much effect upon human 
behavior, if that is what legal norms are intended to do. It seems 
clearly more desirable to so define the concept of legal obligation 
that (P3) is the case, that is, so that it is not (logically) provable that 
tautologies are (legally) obligatory. 
Finally, with respect to the fourth non-provable statement invol­
ving the concept of legal obligation - namely, (P4) - it would be 
strange beyond belief for obligation (of any kind, legal included) to 
be defined otherwise. To contend that p-** OPp is to contend that 
it is against the law for anything that is, in fact, done to be forbidden 
by the law. This would forbid the legislature (as a matter of logic) 
from commanding or prohibiting any kind of human behavior. To 
deny (P4) would just be too bizarre to consider seriously. 
The final pair of properties that should be among the minimum 
prerequisites of any adequate definition of legal obligation involve 
statements of provability about statements involving legal obligation. 
Unlike the first four, these cannot be justified by merely giving coun­
ter-examples. To argue for (P5) is to contend that as a matter of logic 
it should be provable that there is a violation of the law if it is not so 
that if Op then p. Notice that this contention is quite different from 
saying that if Op then p. The latter is saying that everything that is 
obligatory is, in fact, done. Alternatively, to say that if Op then p is 
to say that there are no violations of law. That is clearly not so, and 
nobody would seriously so contend. All that 'O(if Op, then p)' 
asserts i'> that '(if Op, then p)' should, as a matter of law, be so; it 
does not assert that it is, in fact, so. Another way of putting it would 
be to say that the concept of legal. obligation should be so defined 
that if there is no violation of the legal command that legal norms 
should be fulfilled, then the legal norms, in fact, have been fulfilled. 
It would be strange to define legal obligation so that this would be 
otherwise. To do so would be to accept the possibility that there 
could be a violation of some legal obligation, but this violation would 
not be a violation of an obligation that legal obligations be fulfilled. 
Finally, to argue for 'Op, O(if p, then q) ---o Oq', rather than (P6) 
is to maintain that it should be logically possible for there to be an 
obligation that p and an o bligation that if p then q, and despite this 
pair of obligations, for 'q' not to be so without violating the legal 
system. That this is (logically) unreasonable is apparent from a con­
sideration of the two possible situations: (a) p and not q, and (b) not 
p and not q. These are the only possible situations where 'q' is not 
so, and both clearly lead to a violation. In situation (a), it must be 
the case that 'not (if p then q)', because 'not q' follows from 'p' and 
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'if p then q'. Therefore, the second obligation would be violated, and 
hence, there would be a violation of one of the norms of the legal 
system, namely, 'O(if p then q)'. In situation (b ), the first obligation, 
namely, 'Op', is violated, and hence, there is a violation of one of the 
norms of the legal system. Since in all cases, 'not q' leads to a viola­
tion of the legal system, by definition, it is obligatory that q. 
By means of these six criteria we shall be able to distinguish from 
eight different formal systems of logic the one that leads to the most 
adequate definition of legal obligation in the sense that it has all six 
properties. But before considering the first formal system, we should 
examine in closer detail what is meant by the expression 'it is (legal­
ly) obligatory that'. It can be contextually defined as follows: 
(13) Op =df If not p, then there is a violation. 
Thus, in some of the systems that will be considered here, 'It is obli­
gatory thaT' is defined in terms of 'if-then', 'not', and 'violation', 
which in turn will be defined in the formal system. The concept of 
violation is defined in terms of the particular individual violations of 
particular legal norms of the legal system. 
(14) V =ab There is a violation. 
It will be the concept that links the formal system realistically to the 
legal system. Operationally in real-world experience when there is a 
particular individual violation, if the matter is appropriately brought 
to the attention of the authorized community decision makers, they 
will bring the resources of the community to bear in pressuring the 
violator. It should also be noted that 'V', in indicating a violation in 
the sense of a violation of the legal system of norms, rather than the 
violation of a particular norm, is exactly like Anderson's 'S' (disjunc­
tion of all sanctions); 'V' is the disjunction of all particular violations 
(V1, V2 , ... Vn). 
Logical System LSJ 
The first logical system to be considered as a possible candidate 
for use in defining 'O' is the ordinary two-valued propositional logic, 
here called LSl. LSl is formulated in the subordinate-proof style of 
Frederic Fitch12 and in the parenthesis-free notation of Jan Lukasie­
wicz,13 as are the other seven systems to be considered. The 'if-then' 
formalized in LSl is material implication and is represented by the 
connective 'C'. Negation is represented by the connective 'N'. Using 
these, 'It is obligatory thaT' (hereafter abbreviated 'ObligatioN') is 
defined in the following contextual definition: 
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(15) Ow =elf CNwV. 
('It is obligatory thaT w' is equal to by definition 'If not 
w, then there is a violation'.) 
LSl can be formulated by the following alphabet, formation rules, 









p q r  S s5 s6 ... 
CKN 
UVWW4 w5 • • •  
Formation Rules 
FRl If a formula is a variable, then it is a WFF. 
FR2 If formulas e and f are WFFs, then 
(a) so are Kef and Cef, and 
(b) , so is Nf. 
FR3 If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the 
above rules, then it is not a WFF. 
Transformation Rules 
Name of Rule Statement of Rule 
TRl Ko: Kvw -* v, w. 
(From the K-WFF 'Kvw', it is assumed to be valid 
to inf er the WFF 'v' and to be valid to inf er the 
WFF 'w'. 
TR2 Ki: v, w -* Kvw. 
(From 'v', 'w', it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Kvw'.) 
TR3 Co: Cvw, v -* w. 
(From 'Cvw' and 'v', it is assumed to be valid to 
infer 'w'.) 
TR4 Ci: (v -** w) -* Cvw. 
(From the provability, in a subordinate proof, of 
'w', given that 'v' is assumed to be true, it is assum­
ed to be valid to infer 'Cvw'. In the statement of 
Right 
the Ci Rule, the parentheses are used to indicate a 
subordinate proof. In the vertical style used by 
Fitch, this would be written: 
Cvw 
TR5 R: w -* (v: ... w). 
(From 'w', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'w' in a 
subordinate proof in which 'v' is a supposition.) 
TR6 No: (Nv -** w, Nw) -* v. 
(From the provability in a subordinate proof of 'w' 
and 'Nw', given that 'Nv' is assumed to be true, it 
is assumed to be valid to infer 'v'.) 
Definitions 
Dl Ad: Avw =df NKvNw. 
('v or w' is equal to by definition 'it is not so that 
(not v and not w)'.) 
D2 Ed: Evw =df KCvwCwv. 
('v is equivalent to w' is equal to by definition 'if 
v then w, and if w then v'.) 
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In LSl so formulated, it is provable that 'C-NCNpV-V' can be 
inferred from 'CNpV'. Since 'Ow' is 'CNwV', the following is the 
case: Op-** OOp. Hence, (Pl) is not fulfilled in LSl. Similarly, it 
can be shown that in LSl (P3) is not fulfilled (because -** 
C-NCpp-V, and hence,-** OCpp) and also that (P4) is not fulfilled 
(because p -** C-C-NCNNpV-V, and hence, p-** OPp). This leads 
to the conclusion that '0' as defined is not adequately formalized in 
LSl because the definition of 'O' in this system does have the first, 
third, and fourth properties that an adequate definition of legal obli­
gation should, as a minimum, have. The concept of obligation de­
fined in LSl would, however, be adequate with respect to (P2), (P5), 
and (P6). 
Logical System LS2 
The efforts by logicians to formalize more adequately the concept 
of 'if-then' have led to consideration of the systems of logic, some­
times referred to as "modal" logic (or more precisely as "alethic" 
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logic). Here we shall consider the possibilities of defining '0' in two 
of the standard systems of alethic logic - the one called System M 
and the one called System S4. The 'if-then' concept of Systems M 
and S4 is usually called "strict" or "logically necessary" implication 
in contrast to the "material" implication of LSl. In these two sys­
tems, the concept of "logical necessity" is here indicated by the 
symbol 'L'. The expression 'LCpq' will be read as 'p necessarily 
implies q' and will represent a different sense of 'if p then q' than is 
represented by 'Cpq' in LSl. 
In System M, it is possible to prove everything that is provable in 
LSl; in addition, some further theorems can be proved. When two 
systems are related in this way, the system in which more theorems 
are provable is called an "extension" of the other system. Hence, M 
is an extension of LSl. There is a sense in which LSl is included in M 
and a sense in which M can be built upon the set of assumptions that 
constitute the formulation of LSl. Here M will be formulated as 
those assumptions (alphabet, formation rules, transformation rules, 
and definitions) of LSl plus some additional ones. The additional 





FRl If a formula is a variable or a constant, then it is a 
WFF. 
FR2 (c) so is Lf. 
Transformation Rules 
Name of Rule Statement of Rule 
TR7 Lo: Lw -* w. 
(From 'w is true necessarily as a matter of logic' it 
is assumed to be valid to infer 'w'.) 
TR8 L()oLi: L( ... w) -* Lw. 
(From an L-restricted subordinate proof that has 
'w' as an item, it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Lw'.) 
For purposes of LS2, an L-restricted subordinate 
proof is one that only L-WFFs can be reiterated in­
to. Reiteration into L-restricted subordinate proofs 
is done by means of TR9, which is similar to the R 
rule of LSl. Both are referred to as reiteration rules 
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-TR5 for reiterating into unrestricted subordinate 
proofs and TR9 for reiterating into L-restricted 
subordinate proofs. 
TR9 LoL( )i: Lw -* L(v: . . .  w), L( .. . w). 
( From 'Lw', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'w' in 
an L-restricted subordinate proof in which 'v' is a 
supposition, and it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'w' in an L-restricted subordinate proof in which 
there are no suppositions.) 
Definitions 
D3 Md: Mw =df NLNw. 
('It is possible that w' is equal to by definition 'it is 
not so that it is logically necessary that not w'.) 
System LS2 is an extension of M obtained by adding the following 
axiom and definitions to M: 
Al MNVa: MNV 
(It is logically possible that there is no violation.) 
D4 Vd: V =df AA . . .  AV1 V2 . • •  Vn+l· _,,_ 'n 
('V' is equal to by definition the disjunction of all 
the violations of a legal system that there can be, 
that is, if 'V' is true then there is at least one viola­
tion of the legal system.) 
D5 Od: Ow =df LC-Nw-V. 
('Ow' is equal to by definition 'LC-Nw-V', which 
when interpreted is: 'it is obligatory that w' is equal 
to 'if not w, then there is a violation'.) 
D6 Pd: Pw =df NONw. 
('Pw' is equal to by definition 'NONw', which when 
interpreted is: 'it is permitted that w' is equal to 
'it is not obligatory that not w'.) 
In LS2 so formulated with 'Ow' so defined, it can be ascertained 
that the following is the case: 
(16) -** OLCpp. 
(17) ---o OLC-Op-p. 
Hence, neither (P3) nor (P5) is fulfilled in LS2, and thus '0' is not 
adequately formalized in this system. 
Logical System LS3 
System S4 is a system of alethic logic that is an extension of M. It 
::an be formulated by merely replacing TR9 of M by the following 
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slightly stronger rule for reiterating into L-restricted subordinate 
proofs: 
TRlO LoL(L)i: Lw -* L(v: ... LW), L (  .. . Lw). 
(From 'Lw' it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Lw' 
in an L-restricted subordinate proof in which 'v' is 
a supposition, and it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Lw' in an L-restricted subordinate proof in which 
there are no suppositions.) 
LS3 is an extension of S4, and it is also an extension of LS2. LS3 
can be obtained by adding axiom Al and definitions D4, D5, and D6 
to S4; or alternatively, it can be obtained by replacing TR9 in LS2 
by TRlO. In LS3 so formulated with 'Ow' so defined, it can be ascer­
tained that not only are (16) and (17) the case but also the following: 
(18) Op -** OOp. 
(19) Op -** LOp. 
Hence, not only (P3) and (P5) but also (Pl) and (P2) fail to be ful-" 
filled in LS3, and thus 'O' is not adequately formalized in this system 
either. 
Logical System LS4 
Frederic Fitch has formulated a system that is an extension of 
84.14 Instead of defining 'O' in terms of 'LC' and ' V' (as in LS2 and 






Name of Rule Statement of Rule 
O()oOi: 0( ... w) -* Ow. 
(From an 0-restricted subordinate proof that has 
'w' as an item, it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Ow'.) 
O(Oo): O(Ow -* w). 
(Within an 0-restricted subordinate proof, from 
'Ow' it is assumed to be valid to infer 'w'.) 
OoOo: Ov, ONv -* w. 
(From 'Ov' and 'ONv', it is assumed to be valid to 
infer 'w'.) 
OoO(O)i: Ow·-* O(v: ... Ow), 0( . . .  Ow). 
(From 'Ow', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Ow' 
in an 0-restricted subordinate proof in which 'v' is 
a supposition , and it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Ow' in an 0-restricted subordinate proof in which 
there are no suppositions.) 
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The result when these four rules are added to 84 is System F(S4) 
(here called LS4) .  So formulated, LS4 is just like LS3 with respect to 
the six properties being considered here of an adequate definition of 
legal obligation, except that (P2) is fulfilled for LS4 while it is not 
for LS3. 
Logical System LS5 
When these four obligation transfomation rules (TR11-TR14) are 
added to System M, the resulting system if System F(M) (here called 
LS5) .  LS5 is exactly like LS2 with respect to the six properties being 
considered : neither (P3) nor (P5) is fulfilled, but the other four are. 
Clearly, in the five systems considered so far, the troublesome pro­
perties are (P3) and (P5). In none of the five systems is (P3) fulfilled, 
and (P5) is fulfilled only in LSL Next to be examined is a system 
that comes to grips with (P3), the most pervasive difficulty . 
Logical System LS6 
An approach to formulating logical systems developed by Ander­
son in collaboration with Nuel D. Belnapt 5 has led to the desired 
result with respect to (P3). In one of Anderson's systems there is 
specified a formalization of 'if-then' that more closely approximates 
its meaning in English prose, i.e., that the consequent somehow logic­
ally follows from and is dependent upon the antecedent. In System 
EIG when it is asserted that the following is true : 
(20) if p then q 
(that is, 'p entails q', or in notation 'Tpq') 
two conditions are required to be fulfilled that, for example, need 
not necessarily be fulfilled with respect to 'Cpq' of LSl : 
and 
(21)  the truth of 'q' follows from the truth of 'p', 
(22) the truth of 'q' is dependent upon the truth of 'p'. 
What these two requirements of relevance and dependence preclude 
are the provability in E of such things as 'T-p-Trr' and 'T-p-Tpr', 
whereas in LSl 'C-p-Crr' and 'C-p-Crp' are provable. With respect to 
'T-p-Trr', (22) is not fulfilled because the truth of 'Trr' is not depen­
dent upon the truth of 'p'. On the other hand, with respect to 'T-p­
Trp' (21)  is not fulfilled because if 'Trp' follows from the truth of 
'p', then when 'p' is true so is "I'rp'. This, in turn, means that when 
'p' is true the two requirements must be fulfilled for the 'r' and 'p' of 
'Trp' for 'Trp' to be true. But when 'p' is true for empirical reasons, 
for example, the truth of 'p' in 'Trp' does not follow from the truth 
of 'r' (leaving (21)  not fulfilled) ,  and it is not dependent upon the 
truth of 'r' (leaving (22) not fulfilled) .  Hence, (21) is not always ful­
filled for 'T-p-Trp'. 
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If the 'LC' of LS2, LS3, LS4, and LS5 is interpreted as entailment, 
the restrictions upon reiteration into L-restricted subordinate proofs 
constrain the systems so that 'LC-p-LCqp' is not provable; therefore, 
requirement (21) is fulfilled. However, (22) is not fulfilled in these 
systems, because 'LC- p-LCrr' is provable. Anderson builds (22) into 
LS6 by specifying a subscripting notation for keeping track of all the 
suppositions actually used in deducing and restricting the entailment­
in rule-Le., T( )oTi-so that only if supposition 'w' is used in deduc­
ing 'v', will it be valid to infer that 'Twv' follows from a proof of 'v', 
given 'w' .11 Requirement ( 21) is built into LS6 the same way that it 
is in LS2, LS3, LS4, and LS5-by restrictions upon reiteration into 
restricted subordinate proofs. 
The set of assumptions for formulating a logical system is called 




















e f fa f4 . . .  
FRl If a formula is a variable or a constant, then it is a 
WFF. 
FR2 If formulas e and f are WFFs, then 
(a) so are Kef, Tef, and Aef, and 
(b) so are fa and Nf. 
Right 1 2 3  
FR3 If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the 
above rules, then it is not a WFF. 
Transformation Rules 
Name of Rule 
Ko': 
Statement of Rule 
Kvwa -*Va, wa. 
where 'a' indicates the set of nu­
merical subscripts on 'Kvw' that 
is carried along to 'v' and 'w'. 
(From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w'), it is assumed to be 
valid to infer 'va' and to be valid to infer 'wa'.) 
Ki': va, wa -* Kvwa. 
where 'a' indicates that the set of 
numerical subscripts on 'v' and 
'w' must be identical and that the 
same set of subscripts is carried 
along to 'Kvw'. 
(From 'va' and 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to in­
fer 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w').) 
To: Tvwa, vb-* WaUb· 
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the 
sets of numerical subscripts on 
'Tvw' and 'v' may be different 
and 'a Ub' indicates that the set 
of subscripts carried along to 'w' 
is the logical sum of 'a' and 'b'. 
(From 'Tvwa' (i.e., 'v entails w') and 'vb', it is as­
sumed to be valid to infer 'waub'.) 
T (  )oTi: T(v[i] -** wa) -* Tvwa�[i] . 
where '[i]' indicates a numerical 
subscript assigned to supposition 
'v' which is distinct from the nu­
merical subscript assigned to any 
other supposition, 'a' is a set of 
subscripts which contains '[i] ', 
and 'a-[i]' is a set of subscripts 
comprised of those in 'a' with 
'[i]' deleted. 
(From the provability, in a T-restricted subordinate 
proof, of 'wa', given that 'v [ il' is assumed to be 
true, it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Tvwa-[i]' 
(i.e., 'v entails w').) 
124 Allen 
ToT(T)i: Tuva -* T(w[i]: . . .  Tuva), 
T( . .. Tuva>· 
where 'a' indicates the set of nu­
merical subscripts on 'Tuv' that is 
carried along upon reiteration 
into a T-restricted subordinate 
proof and '[i]' indicates a numer­
ical subscript assigned to supposi­
tion 'w' which is distinct from 
the numerical subscript assigned 
to any other supposition. 
(From 'Tuva' (i.e., 'u entails v'), it is assumed to be 
valid in a T-restricted subordinate proof to infer 
'Tuva'• given that 'w[i]' is assumed to be true, and 
it is assumed to be vahd in a T-restricted subordin­
ate proof to infer 'Tuva'.) 
Rp': wa -* Wa· 
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'wa'.) 
AoNKi': Avwa -* NKNvNwa. 
(From 'Avwa' (i.e., 'v or w'), it is assumed to be 
valid to infer 'NKNvNwa' (i.e., 'not (not v and not 
w)'.) 
NKoAi': 
(From 'NKNvNwa' (i.e., 'not (not v and now w)'), 
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Avwa' (i.e.1 'v or 
w').) 
KoAi2': KuAvwa -* AKuvwa. 
(From 'KuAvwa' (i.e., �u and (v or w)'), it is assum­
ed to be valid to infer 'AKuvwa' (i.e., '(u and v) or 
w').) 
ToNo: Tvwa, Nwb -* NvaUb· 
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that the 
sets of numerican subscripts on 
'Tvw' and 'Nw' may be different 
and 'aUb' indicates that the set of 
subscripts carried along to 'Nv' is 
the logical sum of 'a' and 'b'. 
(From 'Tvwa' (i.e., 'v entails w') and 'Nwb' (i.e., 
'not w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Nvaub' 





T(v[i] -** wa, Nwb) -* Nvaub-[i]. 
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that 
the sets of numerical subscripts 
on 'w' and 'Nw' may be differ­
ent, '[i]' indicates a numerical 
subscript assigned to supposition 
'v' which is distinct from the nu­
merical subscript assigned to any 
other supposition and is contain­
ed i n  both 'a'  and 'b', and 
'aUb-[i]' indicates that the set of 
subscripts carried along to 'Nv' is 
<;:omprised of those in 'aUb' with 
'[i]' deleted. 
(From the provability in a T-restricted subordinate 
proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given that 'v [il' is assum­
ed to be true, it is assumed to be vafid to infer 
'Nvaub-[i] '.) 
wa -* NNwa. 
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'NNwa' (i.e., 'not with w').) 
NNwa-*wa. 
(From 'NNwa' (i.e., 'not not w'), it is assumed to 
be valid to infer 'w a'.) 
The following tabulated summary of a proof of the transitivity of 
'T' (entailment) illustrates a proof in System E. 
To To Ti Tpq1, Tqr2 -** Tpr12 
1 Tpq1 s 
2 Tqr2 s 
3 Ta Pa s 
b Tpq1 l,ToT(T)i 
c q13 b,a,To 
d Tqr2 2,ToT(T)i 
e ri23 d.c,To 
4 Tpr12 3,T()oTi 
Several things about the proof of ToToTi should be noted: 
(a) Each supposition is assigned a unique numerical subscript 
(items 1, 2, and 3a). 
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(b) When 'q' is inferred from 'Tpq' and 'p' as item 3c, their sub­
scripts, 1 and 3, respectively, are carried along to 'q'. Similar­
ly, for item 3e. 
(c) When 'Tpr' is inferred as item 4 from the proof of 'r', given 'p' 
as a supposition, the 3-subscript of 'p' is contained in the 
123-subscript of 'r', and the 1 2-subscript of 'Tpr' is the result 
of deleting 3 from 123. 
A typographically more convenient as well as more perspicuous sum­
mary tabulation for checking purposes results if subscripts are eleva­
ted to the line-level of the WFF and listed in a column between the 
proof and its justification, as in the following tabulation of a proof: 
-** T-TpTqr-TKpqr 
1 Ta TpTqr 1 s 
b Tl Kpq 2 s 
2 TpTqr 1 a,ToT(T)i 
3 p 2 1 ,Ko 
4 Tqr 12 2,3,To 
5 q 2 1 ,Ko 
6 r 12 4,5,To 
c TKpqr 1 b,T( )oTi 
2 T-TpTqr-TKpqr l,T( )oTi 
The 'if-then' (represented by 'T') formalized in System E thus for­
mulated permits formalization of a concept of legal obligation that 
does fulfill (P3). The following set of transformation rules, axioms, 
and definitions, along with those for E, form the basis for LS6, with­
in which '0' is defined. 
L( )oLi' : L( . . .  wa) -* Lwa. 
( From an L-restricted subordinate proof that has 
'wa' as an item that is not a supposition, it is as­
sumed to be valid to infer 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is logically 
necessary that w') . )  
LoL(L)i' : Lwa -* L(v[i]: . . .  Lwa), L( . . .  
Lwa>· 
where 'a' indicates the set of nu­
merical subscripts on 'Lw' that is 
carried along upon reiteration in­
to an L-restricted subordinate 




merical subscript assigned to sup­
position 'v' which is distinct 
from the numerical subscript as­
signed to any other supposition. 
{From 'Lwa' {i.e., 'it is logically necessary that w'), 
it is assumed to be valid in an L-restricted subor­
dinate proof to infer 'Lwa'. given that 'v [i]' is as­
sumed to be true, and it is assumed to be valid in 
an L-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'Lwa'.) 
Lo': Lwa -* wa. 
(From 'Lwa' (i.e., 'it is logically necessary that w'), 
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Lwa'.) 
MNVa: MNV. 
(It is logically possible that there is no violation.) 
Vd: V =df AA . . .  AV1V2 . . . Vn+l· '--..-' n 
('There is a violation' is equal to by definition 
'there is a violation of particular legal norm #1 
or there is a violation of particular legal norm #2, 
. . .  , or there is a violation of particular legal norm 
# (n+l)', where there are just n+l norms in the 
legal system. 
Md: Mw =df NLNw. 
{'It is logically possible that w' is equal to by defi­
nition 'it is not so that it is logically necessary that 
not w'.) 
Od: Ow =df TNwV. 
('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by definition 
'not w entails there is a violation'.) 
Pd: Pw =df NONw. 
('It is permitted that w' is equal to by definition 'it 
is not so that it is obligatory that not w'.) 
The concept of if-then formalized by 'T' in LS6, when used to 
relate the forbidden act to the violation in the definition of legal ob­
ligation, leads to the following: 
(23) -o OTpp. 
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This means that (P3) is fulfilled for the 'O' of LS6. Unhappily, how­
ever, the following are also the case: 
(24) Op -** LOp. 
(25) -o OTOpp. 
These mean that (P2) and ( P5) are not fulfilled in LS6. Happily, 
however, both of these can be remedied if 'O' is defined in terms of a 
still different concept of if-then, which is explored in the next logical 
system to be considered here. 
Logical System LS7 
The entailment concept o f  if-then formalized in LS6 requires both 
relevance and dependence. In 187 there is introduced a weak impli­
cation ('W') concept of if-then, which has the same relevance require­
ment as entailment, but a slightly weaker dependence requirement. If 
legal obligation is defined in terms of a weak implication relation be­
tween the forbidden state o f  affairs and the violation, the non-fulfill­
ment of (P2) and (P5) are remedied, but another problem results. 
The basis for LS7 can be obtained by making the following 
changes in LS6: 
1 .  Replace the 'T' in the alphabet by 'W'. 
2. Replace the 'Tef' in FR2 by 'Wef'. 
3. Replace the transformation rules: 
To, T()oTi, ToT(T)i, ToNo, and T()oNi 
by the transformation rules: 
Wo, W()oWi, W()i, WoNo, and W()oNI 
shown below. 
Wo: 
(From 'Wvwa' (i.e., 'v weakly implies w') and 'vb', 
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'waub'.) 
W( )oWi: W (v[i] -** wa) -* Wvwa-[i] 
where [i] is in a. 
(From the provability, in a W-restricted subordin­
ate proof, of 'wa', given that 'v[i]' is assumed to be 
true, it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Wvwa-[i]' 
(i.e., 'v weakly implies w').) 
W( )i: wa -* W(v[i]: . . wa), W( ... 
wa). 
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid in a W-restrict­
ed subordinate proof to infer 'wa', given that 'v[i ] ' 
is assumed to be true, and it is assumed to be vahd 
in a W-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'wa'.) 
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WoNo 
(From 'Wvwa' (i.e., 'v weakly implies w') and 
'Nwb', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'Nvaub'· 
W()oNi: W ( v  [ i] -* *  wa, N wb) -* 
Nvaub-[i] 
where [i] is in both a and b. 
(From the provability in a W-restricted subordinate 
proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given that 'Nvril' is as­
sumed to be true, it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Nvaub-[i] '.) 
4. Replace Od by the Od shown below. 
Od: Ow =df WNwV 
('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by definition 
'not w weakly implies there is a violation'.) 
The relationship between entailment ('T' of LS6) and weak impli­
cation ('W' of LS7) can be made more evident by adding the follow­
ing definition to LS7: 
Td: Tvw =df LWvw. 
('v entails w' is equal to by definition 'it is logically 
necessary (in the 84 sense) that v weakly implies 
w'.) 
The entailment concept of LS7, thus defined, is exactly the same 
concept of if-then as the entailment concept of LS6. It is of some 
interest that 'W' is related to 'T' in the way that 'C' is related to 'LC' 
(of 84): 
Tvwa -** Wvw. 
LCvw -** Cvw. 
In LS7 the concept of legal 
happy results: 
(26) Op -o LOp, 
(27) -** OWOpp. 
L( . . . Wvwa) -** Tvwa. 
L( . . .  Cvw)-** LCvw. 
obligation leads to the following 
Therefore, (P2) and (P5) are fulfilled. However, 
(28) p -** OPp. 
This means that (P4) is not fulfilled. It is, however, the only one of 
the six requisite properties that the legal obligation concept of LS7 
fails to have. In LS8 that last flaw is eliminated. 
Logical System LSB 
In each of the seven systems considered so far as possible candi­
dates for use in defining the concept of obligation there has been at 
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least one flaw in terms of the six criteria being used to evaluate the 
adequacy of proposed definitions of obligation. This is summarized 
in Table 1 below where the asterisks ( *) indicate the unsatisfactory 
properties of the definition of obligation in each of the seven sys­
tems. 
Table 1 
LS1 LS2 LS3 LS4 LS5 LS6 LS7 
Pl * * * 
P2 * * 
P3 * * * * * 
P4 * * 
P5 * * * * * 
P6 
* = definition of obligation is 
unsatisfactory in this respect 
One system that satisfactorily fulfills the six criteria being used 
possesses all the complexity of LS7-and then some more. This sys­
tem, LS8, defines obligation in terms of still another concept of if­
then, namely what here shall be called 'natural implication'. Natural 
implication, in turn, is defined in terms of natural necessity and gen­
uine implication, while n atural necessity is defined in terms of the 
laws of nature and genuine implication. Genuine implication is a vari­
ant of if-then that is slightly weaker than weak implication. It is like 
weak implication in every respect except that double negation intro­
duction holds for some but not all of the expressions in the system 
that defines genuine implication. 
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FRl If a formula is a variable or a constant, then it is a 
WFF. 
FR2 If formulas e and f are WFFs, then 
(a) so are Kef, Gef, and Aef, and 
(b) so are fa, Bf, Rf, Lf, Mf, and Nf. 
FR3 If a formula is not a WFF by virtue of one of the 
above rules, then it is not a WFF. 
Transformation Rules 
Name of Rule Statement of Rule 
Ko': Kvwa -* va, wa. 
(From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w'), it is assumed to be 
valid to infer 'va' and it is assumed to be valid to 
infer 'wa'.) 
Ki': va, wa -* Kvwa. 
where 'a' indicates that the set of 
numerical subscripts on 'v' and 
'w' must be identical and that 
the same set of subscripts is car­
ried along to 'Kvw'. 
(From 'va' and 'wa'. it is assumed to be valid to 
infer 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w').) 
Go': Gvwa, vb -* WaUb· 
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that 
the se ts of numerical subscripts 
on 'Gvw' and 'v' may be differ­
ent and 'aUb' indicates that the 
se t  of subscripts carried along to 
'w' is the logical sum of 'a' and 
'b'. 
(From 'Gvwa' (i.e., 'v genuinely implies w') and 
'vb', it is assumed to be valid to infer 'waub'. )  
G (  )oGi': G(v[i] -* * wa) -* Gvwa-[i]. 
where '[i]' indicates a numerical 
subscript assigned to supposition 
'v' which is distinct from the nu-
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merical subscript assigned to any 
other supposition, 'a' is a set of 
subscripts which contains '[i] ', 
and 'a-[i]' is a set of subscripts 
comprised of those in 'a' with 
'[i] ' deleted. 
(From · the provability, in a G-restricted subordin­
ate proof, of 'wa'. given that 'vn]' is assum ed to be 
true, it is assumed to be valicf to infer 'Gvwa-[i]' 
(i.e., 'v genuinely implies w').) 
G( )i': wa -* G (v[i]: . . .  wa), G( . . .  
wa>· 
where 'a' indicates the set of nu­
merical subscripts on 'w' that is 
carried along on reiteration into 
a G-restricted subordinate proof 
and '[i]' indicates a numerical 
subscript assigned to supposition 
'v' which is distinct from the nu­
merical subscript assigned to any 
other supposition. 
(From 'wa'. it is assumed to be valid in a G-restrict­
ed subordinate proof to infer 'wa'• given that 'v[i) ' 
is assumed to be true, and it is assumed to be valid 
in a G-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'wa'.) 
GoNo': Gvwa, Nwb - * NvaUb· 
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that 
the sets of numerical subscripts 
on 'Gvw' and 'Nw' may be differ­
ent and 'aUb' indicates that the 
set of subscripts carried along to 
'Nv' is the logical sum of 'a' and 
'b'. 
(From 'Gvwa' (i.e., 'v genuinely implies w') and 
'Nw' (i.e., 'not w'), it is assumed to be valid to in­
fer 'Nvaub' (i.e., 'not v').) 
G()oNi': G ( v [ i ]  - ** W a, N wb) -* 
Nvaub-[i]. 
where 'a' and 'b' indicate that 
the sets of numerical subscripts 
on 'w' and 'Nw' may be differ­
ent, '[i]' indicates a numerical 
subscript assigned to supposition 
'v' which is distinct from the nu-
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merical subscript assigned to any 
other supposition and is contain­
ed i n  both 'a '  and 'b', and 
'aUb-[i]' indicates that the set of 
subscripts carried along to 'Nv' is 
comprised of those in 'aUb' with 
'[i]' deleted. 
(From the provability in a G-restricted subordinate 
proof of 'wa' and 'Nwb', given that 'Nv r il' is as­
sumed to be true, it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Nva ub-[i] '.) 
Rp': The same as in LS6. 






The same as in LS6. 
The same as in LS6. 
The same as in LS6. 
The same as in LS6. 
The same as in LS6. 
Ai': Wa -* Avwa, Awva, 
(From 'wa'. it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Avwa' (i.e., 'v or w') and to be valid to infer 
'Awva' (i.e. , 'w or v').) 
KoNNK.i': Kvwa -* NNKvwa 
(From 'Kvwa' (i.e., 'v and w'), it is assumed to be 
valid to infer 'NNKvwa' (i.e., 'not not v-and-w').) 
LoR(L)i': Lwa -* R(v [ i]: . . . Lwa), 
R( . . .  Lwa) 
where 'a' indicates the set of nu­
merical subscripts on 'Lw' that is 
carried along upon reiteration in­
to an R-restricted subordinate 
proof and '[i]' indicates a nu­
merical subscript assigned to sup­
p osit ion 'v' which is distinct 
from the numerical subscript as­
signed to any other supposition. 
(From 'Lwa' (i.e. , 'it is logically necessary that w'), 
it is assumed to be valid in an R-restricted subor­
dinate p roof to infer 'Lwa'. given that 'v[i]' is as­
sumed to be true, and it is assumed to be valid in 
an R-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'Lwa'. ) 
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LoLNNi': 
(From ' Lwa' (i.e . ,  'it is logically necessary that w'), 
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'LNNwa' (i.e ., 'it 
is logically necessary that not w').)  
MoNLNi': 
(From 'Mwa' (i.e . ,  'it is logically possible that w'), 
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'NLNwa' (i.e.,  'it 
is not logically necessary that not w') .) 
NLNoMi' : 
(From 'NLNwa' (i.e., 'it is not logically necessary 
that not w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Mwa' (i .e ., 'it is logically possible that w').) 
GoNBNi':  GZwa -* NBNwa . 
(From 'GZwa' (i.e., 'the laws of nature1 s  genuine­
ly imply that w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'NBNwa' (i.e., 'it is not naturally necessary that 
not w') - )  
MIG': 
(From 'wa', it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it is logically possible for both the 
laws of nature and w to be true').) 
MKoNGi' :  MKZwa -* NGZNwa. 
(From 'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it is logically possible for 
both the laws of nature and w to be true'), it is 
assumed to be valid to infer 'NGZNwa' (i.e.,  'it is 
not so that the laws of nature genuinely imply that 
not w').)  
RoGi': 
(From 'Rwa' (i.e . ,  'it is naturally necessary that 
w'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 'GZwa' (i.e., 
'the laws of nature genuinely imply that w').) 
GoRi': GZwa -* Rwa. 
(From 'GZwa' (i.e., 'the laws of nature genuinely 
imply that w') ,  it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'Rwa' ( i .e., 'it is naturally necessary that w') . )  
R( )oRi' : R( . . .  wa) -* Rwa· 
(From an R-restricted subordinate proof that has 
'wa' as an item that is not a supposition, it is as­
sumed to be valid to infer 'Rwa' (i.e . ,  'it is natural­





Rwa -* R ( v [ i ] : . . .  Rwa) ,  
R (  . . .  Rwa) · 
where 'a' indicates the set of nu­
merical subscripts on 'Rw' that is 
carried along upon reiteration in­
to an R-restricted subordinate 
proof and ' [i] ' indicates a nu­
merical subscript assigned to sup­
position ' v' which is distinct 
from the numerical subscript as­
signed to any other supposition. 
(From 'Rwa' (i.e., 'it is naturally necessary that 
w'), it is assumed to be valid in an R-restricted sub­
ordinate proof to infer 'Rwa'. given that 'v nJ ' is 
assumed to be true, and it is assumed to be vahd in 
an R-restricted subordinate proof to infer 'Rwa'.)  
BoMKi':  Bwa -* MKZwa. 
(From 'Bwa' (i.e ., 'it is naturally possible that w'), 
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it 
is logically possible that both the laws of nature 
and w are true').) 
MKoBi': MKZwa -* Bwa. 
(From 'MKZwa' (i.e., 'it is logically possible that 
both the laws of nature and w are true'), it is as­
sumed to be valid to infer 'Bwa' (i.e. ,  'it is natural­
ly possible that w').) 
MNVa: MNV. 
(It is logically possible that there is no violation.) 
Za: Z.  
(The laws of nature are true.) 
Vd: 
Id: 
The same as in LS6. 
Ivw =df RGvw. 
('v naturally implies w' is equal to by definition 'it 
is naturally necessary that v genuinely implies w'.) 
Od : Ow =df INwV. 
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('It is obligatory that w' is equal to by definition 
'not w naturally implies that there is a violation'.)  
Pd: The same as in LS6. 
The relationships between the logical concepts and natural con­
cepts considered with respect to which can and cannot be inf erred 
from each other as formulated in LSS are summarized in Figure 1 .  



















Mwa *-* NLNwa where -** = provability of validity 
-o non-provability of validity 
-* = assumption of validity 
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L = logical necessity 
N = negation 
M = logical possibility 
R = natural necessity · 
B = natural possibility 
G = genuine implication 
Z = laws of nature 
I = natural implication 
K = conjunction 
The following are also the case in LSS: 
p -o OOp 
Op -o LOp 
-o Olpp 
P -o OPp 
-** OIOpp 
Op, Olpq -** Oq 
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Hence, all six of the criteria being used to test the adequacy of a 
definition of the concept of obligation are met by 'O' as defined in 
LSS. With the complex task of adequately defining obligation now 
taken care of, there is just one more brief matter to be considered 
before turning to the formal definition of RighT-namely, what it 
means for something to "be done", to "be done by someone", and 
to "be done for someone". 
Done, Done By, and Done For 
To say that something has been done is an abbreviated way of 
making a statement of fact that it is true that a given state of affairs 
is the case. Similarly, to say that something has been done by person 
x is an abbreviated way of stating that responsibility for the fact that 
a given state of affairs happens to be the case is ascribed to person x 
by virtue of some articulated (or unarticulated) policies. So, too, is 
saying that something has been done for x an abbreviated way of 
stating that x is a person on whose behalf a given state of affairs is 
the case according to some articulated (or unarticulated) policies. Be­
cause the formal definition of RighT involves such concepts, it will 




Name of Rule Statement of Rule 
DoloDi': 
(From 'Dva' (i.e., 'v has been done') and 'lvwv' 
(i.e., 'v naturally implies w'), it is assumed to be 
valid to infer 'DwaUb' (i.e., 'Dw has been done').) 
D2oloD2i': D2vxa' lvwb -* D2waUb· 
(From 'D2vxa' (i.e., 'v has been done by x') and 
'Ivwb' (i.e., 'v naturally implies w'), it is assumed 
to be valid to infer 'D2WJtam' (i.e., 'w has been 
done by x').) 
D4oID4i':  D4VXa' Ivwt> -* D4WXaUb· 
(From 'D4na' (i.e., 'v has been done for x') and 
'Ivwb' (i.e., 'v naturally implies w'), it is assumed 
to be valid to infer 'D4WXaUb' (i.e., 'w has been 
done for x').) 
D2oDi': D2wxa -*  Dwa . 
(From 'D2wxa' (i.e., 'w has been done for x'), it is 
assumed to be valid to infer 'Dwa' (i.e., 'w has been 
done').) 
D4oDi': 
(From 'D4wa' (i.e., 'w bas been done for x'), it is 
assumed to be valid to infer 'Dwa' (i.e., 'w bas been 
done').) 
OD2oDNoD2Ni': OD2WXa. DNwb -* D2NWXaUb· 
(From •on2WXa' (i.e., 'it is obligatory that w be 
done by x') and 'DNwb' (i.e., 'not w has been 
done ') , it is assumed to be valid to infer 
•n2NWXam' (i.e., 'not w bas been done by x').) 
OD4oDNoD4Ni': 0D4WXa, DNwb -* D4NWJeaUb· 
(From 'OD4mta • (i.e., 'it is obligatory that w be 
done for x') and 'DNwb' (i.e., 'not w has been 
don e " ) ,  it is assumed to be valid to infer 
'D4N-wxam/ (i.e., 'not w hai beei1I done for x').) 
D2NoND2i': D2NWXa -* ND2wxa. 
(From 'D2NWXa' (i.e., 'not w has been done by x'), 
it is assumed to be valid to infer 'ND2wXa,' (i.e., 'it 
is not so that w has been done by x').) 
D4NoND4i': D4NWXa, --* ND4WXa 
(From 'D4NWXa,' (i.e., 'not w has been done for 
x'), it is assumed to be valid to infer 'ND4w:xa' 
(i.e., 'it is not so that w has been done for x').) 
Definitions 
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D24d: D24wxy =df K-D2wx-D4wy 
('w has been done by x for y' is equal to by defini­
tion 'w has been done by x and w has been done 
for y'.) 
D42d: D42wxy =df K-D4wx-D2wy 
('w has been done for x to y' is equal to by defini­
tion 'w has been done for x and w has been done 
by y'.) 
RighTd: RighT-wxy =df OD24wxy 
('y has a right that w with respect to x' is equal to 
by definition 'it is obligatory that w be done by x 
for y'.) 
DutYd: DutY-wxy =df OD42wxy 
('y has a duty to w with respect to x' is equal to by 
definition 'it is obligatory that w be done for x by 
y'.) 
NorighTd: NorighT-wxy =df NOD24wxy 
('y has a noright that w with respect to x '  is equal 
to by definition 'it is not obligatory that w be done 
by x with respect to y'.) 
PrivilegEd: PrivilegE-wxy =df NOND42wxy 
('y has a privilege to w with respect to x' is equal 
to by definition 'it is not obligatory that it not be 
so that w is done for x by y'.) 
These definitions of RighT, DutY, NorighT, and PrivilegE lead to 
the relationships specified by Hohfeld as summarized in Figure 2 .  
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It is obligatory that 




It is obligatory that 
w be done for y by x. 
(OD42wyx) 









N-NorighT-wxy **--------- * *  N-PrivilegE-Nwyx 
(NNOD24wxy )  
It is not the case that 
it is not obligatory that 
w be done by x for y. 
(NNOD42wyx) 
It is not the case that 
it is not obligatory that 
w be done by y for x. 
Further exploration into the Hohfeldian system to formalize the 
concepts of Conditional righT and PoweR is beyond the scope of this 
article. Formalization of these two concepts and other associated 
with them requires introduction of functional calculus, as well as the 
concept of time. This will be treated in a subsequent article. 
CONCLUSION 
The first part of Hohfeld's system of analysis-namely the part 
that deals with Rights. DutieS, NorightS, and PrivilegeS-is formal­
ized in the preceding pages after detailed consideration of the prob­
lems involved in defining ObligatioN, which in tum is used in defin­
ing RighT and the other three Hohfeldian concepts. Six criteria are 
proposed for testing the adequacy of any definition of ObligatioN, 
and it is shown that the difficulties of most definitions of 'O' are 
linked with how if-then is formalized in the various logical systems 
considered. Certainly, one may wish to add to these criteria and fur­
ther refine the concept of ObligatioN, or one may opt for a different 
outcome with respect to the six properties explored. The important 
point is not that a complete and final stipulation of ObligatioN (and 
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the other concepts that depend upon it) shall be definitively achieved 
in this article, but rather that the p10cess of carefully arriving at such 
definitions be illustrated. To the extent that other efforts are similar­
ly careful, the research endeavors and analyses of legal scholars can 
become more cumulative. We would do well to profit -from the ex­
perience of the natural sciences in this respect and ever recall that . . .  
a dwarf sitting on the shoulders of a giant 
can see farther than the giant. 
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